For months, I have made the same argument: the IRGC is weak and will lose. The numbers have taken longer to surface than the strategic reality, but they are now increasingly difficult to dismiss. More interesting is why recognition took so long. Part of the answer lies in the effectiveness of the Islamic Republic’s propaganda. Another part lies in assumptions about Iran and the Middle East that have remained remarkably resistant to evidence.
Three assumptions in particular have distorted much of the debate about Iranian power.
The first is the role of the proxies. IRGC power has never just been about missiles, drones, or the nuclear program. Tehran’s real competitive advantage lay in force multiplication across multiple theaters. Hezbollah threatened Israel from Lebanon, Hamas from Gaza, Iraqi militias targeted U.S. forces, the Houthis menaced shipping and Gulf states, and Assad’s Syria provided the logistical corridor to the Levant. That network gave the IRGC strategic depth, distributed deterrence, and an economy-of-force model that allowed Tehran to impose multi-theater pressure while limiting Iran’s direct exposure and forcing its adversaries to disperse assets, attention, and operational capacity.
Since October 7, almost the reverse of what Tehran wanted has happened. Assad fell. Hamas is fragmented. Hezbollah is confused and has lost much of the leadership structure that made it such a powerful partner to the IRGC. By September 2024, Israel eliminated Hezbollah's top commanders, and Syria, which for years gave Tehran geography, logistics, and access to Lebanon, is no longer available in the same way. The regional system Iran spent decades building has taken one blow after another.
That change is central to understanding IRGC power. Tehran’s strength came from force multiplication. Iranian missiles were far more threatening when combined with militias, logistical corridors, political allies, and pressure across several theaters. Iran still has serious military capabilities, but many of the mechanisms that once amplified them are weaker, less coordinated, or gone. The U.S. campaign may look slow from the outside, but much of its effect comes from compounding those losses.
The second assumption concerns the Islamic Republic itself. Kissinger once said that “Iran had to decide whether it wanted to be a nation or a cause.” The Islamic Republic has always tried to be both, a state governing Iran and a revolutionary project extending beyond it, sustained by clerical institutions, security bodies, the IRGC, religious foundations, commercial networks, patronage systems, militias, and political organizations.
That complexity has historically given the regime considerable resilience because overlapping institutions could absorb shocks and compensate for losses elsewhere in the system. Recent strikes have tested that capacity by disrupting command structures, removing senior figures, and damaging military capabilities across several nodes at once. Reconstitution now comes at a moment of severe economic strain, with inflation projected at roughly 69 percent. Tehran now faces a regeneration problem as much as a military one: rebuilding capabilities, replacing personnel, preserving elite cohesion, maintaining domestic order, and sustaining the remaining regional network all draw on the same shrinking pool of resources.
The third assumption is that Iran can live with sanctions forever because it has already done so for decades. That argument sounds convincing until one looks at how sanctions actually worked. Tehran retained considerable room to sell oil, move foreign currency, use exchange houses and front companies, work through foreign financial centers, and keep money flowing to the IRGC. Sanctions existed, but enforcement left large gaps.
The present U.S. campaign is different because enforcement is increasingly aimed at closing those gaps. Since February 2025, OFAC has sanctioned more than 1,000 Iran-related people, vessels, and aircraft. Treasury is targeting oil networks, shadow banking, shipping, currency exchanges, procurement channels, digital assets, and intermediaries in China, Hong Kong, the UAE, Turkey, and elsewhere. The objective is to follow the money from the moment Iran earns it to the moment the IRGC can actually use it.
The recent Hezbollah designation is a good example. Treasury redesignated Hezbollah under its counterterrorism authority on the basis of its relationship with the IRGC Qods Force and simultaneously targeted the financial channels moving Iranian money through Lebanon, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran. The significance lies in how the U.S. campaign is being structured. Washington is increasingly treating the IRGC, its proxies, and the financial networks behind them as part of a single system.
Hormuz offers another example of why assumptions about Iranian power need to be reconsidered. The Strait was always a temporary card. Iran needed to weaponize it hard enough and long enough to produce two things: a serious global economic shock and enough political panic to constrain the President of the United States. Tehran caused disruption and pushed an enormous propaganda campaign around the Strait. The political effect it needed never materialized.
Reliance on Hormuz also exposed the limits of IRGC power. At the height of Iranian regional influence, maritime pressure could have been combined with sustained escalation from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. By the time Tehran needed that system at full strength, several of those fronts had already been badly weakened. Missiles, drones, shipping threats, and economic disruption were left carrying much more of the burden.
The broader U.S. campaign makes more sense when seen this way. Why spend so much political capital on Lebanon? Why bring Iraqi leaders to the White House? Why work with the UAE on financial pressure? Because IRGC power has always depended on much more than Iran itself.
The real question today is no longer simply whether the Islamic Republic survives, but what it must sacrifice to do so. Tehran is trying to preserve a revolutionary project whose costs are rising as the state’s resources shrink. Something has to give. Either the project contracts, or the state absorbs the cost of keeping it alive. That choice will be watched across the region, and this is where the U.S. campaign can win: by exposing the gap between the power Iran claims and the power the IRGC can actually mobilize.
Convincing analysis of US strategy on Iran, thanks!