The terrorist group has renewed attacks on Saudi Arabia as the kingdom faces a broader regional war. But a weakened Iran could finally threaten their ability to keep fighting.
The headline lured me in, but I feel that the article is missing a huge piece of the puzzle, which 'the long warred' alludes to in their comment. This article looks at the external factors, but I feel internal factors are missing. Yemeni politics are extremely complex, the tribe and tribal confederations play a huge part.
Without taking into account why the Houthis are able to maintain cohesion, any analysis will be missing a crucial part. Cohesion doesn't come from centralized command, it comes from trust, clear orders, strong deals between tribes, balanced tribal power - in some ways this started when the Zaydi royals were deposed in '62, they've been trying to take back power ever since, and by not including them in the larger national project the Sunni government sowed the seeds of the Houthi insurgency. Saudi interference hasn't helped.
The Houthis can't be defeated without taking into account what is a Houthi, why does the Houthi have strength, what does the Houthi want, and what can the Houthi offer the non-Houthi Yemenite.
The Houthis are a family/clan/tribe, with a long history, their initial fight was against mis-management by the government and Saudi interference.
Iran is a part of this for sure, and Iran is probably going to prioritize the Houthis over other aligned movements, because the Houthis give Iran something none of the others do - power over Saudi Arabia and the US.
While they're Iran aligned and allied, they're not puppets, and have shown pragmatism when needed, such as the 2025 war which resulted in a deal with the US - which Trump seems to want to adhere to.
I would also like to push back against the often used term "ragtag", often accompanied by "in flip flops" and so on. This tendency to use verbiage that implies they are disorganized, poorly supplied and poorly trained, prevents proper analysis and leads to underestimation of their strength and sophistication.
The term 'terrorist group' - while alarming, creates an image of a limited group of terrorists, not a cohesive, centrally controlled, army that can call on perhaps as many as 350 000 fighters (altho most are less trained that the core cadres, and may not be as ideological, they will follow their tribal elders and fight the Sunnis when asked).
You could use the same verbiage about the Afghans - a people who defeated three vast empires with access to all the most modern technology, and remain standing.
Their core armed leadership are sophisticated warriors, who know how to manage their tribal alliances and griefs, with access to a wide range of technologies that they know how to use.
These are hard men, from a hard land, and what they want is mostly to control their own country, which is also what the UAE aligned militias (STC) wanted (and still want, which is why SA pushed the UAE out). The fight is over which faction/clan should rule, along with the usual Sunni/Shiia divide, and opposition to Saleh's decades of corruption and mismanagement - all of which may, or may not, be overcome with clever leadership.
The internationally recognized govt in Yemen is run from hotel rooms in Riyadh, their policy more or less dictated by MBS. Their forces are not a cohesive Yemeni army, infighting, tribalism, factionalism and warring for positions, as well as the remote control from Saudi Arabia, reduces it's fighting strength. Simply put - Yemeni govt forces are not particularly loyal to the government for the most part, but to their clan/tribe and that tribal leader. It's an incredibly complex web of alliances, tribalism, personal connections and so on (as are SA's armed forces, which is why it may not be a great a fighting force as one may think).
As long as Saudi Arabia continues their heavy handed meddling, or downright dictation, this will continue.
I say this not to defend the Houthis, but to highlight that local conditions apply, and to warn against underestimating them, or overestimating what can be achieved with modern tech and sanctions. Without solving the under lying problem caused by SA and unification, there will be more fighting.
Trump could have prevented the fall of Mocha, but chose not to. The reasons why are not known, but the American are on record saying that there's no problem with oil, the US can supply everyone..
He's held to the 2025 deal, and CENTCOM is most likely running out of spare ammo that can be used against them, in addition to not wanting to provoke attacks on Red Sea shipping.
If the Houthis want to take Aden, and succeed, which seems likely without US intervention, then they will control the most populated areas, and of course, the Suez canal through their control of Bab a-Mandeb.
My assessment is that at this time, we may want to see if the Houthis are willing to take a pragmatic view of the world and mimic al-Sharaa - if they do, they may bring stability to country that has suffered immensely over the past decades.
By not taking SA's side we may prevent Twelver Shiism (from Iran) and Wahabbism (from SA) from taking over Yemen, which may, in the fullness of time, be for the better.
You're right, ragtag is selling the Houthis short -- and terrorist is needlessly inflammatory. Calling them cavemen is explaining why they're hard to destroy -- at least the surviving Houthis. They continue to be quite capable engineers, and their favorite book is Snowcrash.
The Houthis are supported by Iran, and their taking of Makha and the islands are long term problems for Trump and the United States. All in all, free trade is in peril. The Strait of Malacca is far more of a danger than either of the small straits in the ME, of course.
Trump with his Golden Dome is already planning for an America that is no longer the World's Navy.
Schelling doesn’t work - incremental escalation and “pressure “ and “raising the costs” doesn’t work. We tried this in Vietnam and abandoned it as this nonsense emboldened the enemy. Since 1945 American foreign policy has not understood that wars are not negotiations and business deals by other means. This has repeatedly led us into endemic conflict which we are completely unsuited for and exhausts our people’s support, not to mention breaks the military. In truth in that region one conflict is always replaced by another. Peace can only be imposed by overwhelming and ruthless force including what is now called genocide, we 🇺🇸 have no need nor stomach for such measures. We 🇺🇸 are inconvenienced, others more interested and not hampered (China) may ultimately take a hand. We 🇺🇸 have oil and China doesn’t.
We’re withdrawing. Morocco you know abuts the Atlantic and Europe, Yemen and the rest do not…
Great comment. It's nice to see somebody arguing about geopolitics on a more informed basis. Although there is always a tendency to veer off towards the naive idiocy of the liberal internationalists or default back into Neocon overcommitments, it's my hope that over time America will shift more towards the realism school. Most analyses tend to break realism down into specific branches: pragmatic realism, restrained realism, and primacist realism.
I think that's a mistake. I think these are actually revealed preferences in players which are actually a set of controls with feedback metrics relating to very particular and individual scenarios. For example, although restraint is a preference it can also be a genuine recognition of the situation and conditions on the ground. The key questions should be in areas like how much of the burden can we shunt off to those who should be dealing with the issue themselves? What are the likely counter factual outcomes if we tweak the restraint dial? How does gross action or the failure to act affect our standing in relation to other points of friction, tension, and potential conflict? To what extent does action in a particular arena draw down upon an already depleted reserve of the American public's patience for further military or materiel commitments?
Every pressure point should be considered in its specifics. Applying a generalised standard across arenas is the first error. The second is sunk costs, as well as the recognition that apparent upfront costs might only represent a downpayment on a far larger commitment.
I think two mistakes in analyses have been made in relation to Iran. First, the illusion of choice. America knew that a far larger flare up was coming at some point along the road. The drone and missile build up was an indicator of the intent to attempt to exercise a veto and tolls on the Strait at a later date. One can quibble about the timeline and argue that there was a small chance that the Iran Regime wouldn't make the play by 2035, but this ignores the fact that ideologically they saw control of the Strait as their right, rather than an infringement on the rights of others to a Regime of Passage unmolested.
In this light, it becomes apparent that American thinking was caught up in the framework of inevitability with a timeline- whether to commit to conflict when relative strengths were favourable, or when they were less favourable at a later date, potentially when political will was lacking. The second analytical error was in failing to recognise the level of commitment required. I don't think the Trump Admin recognised the level of commitment they would be required to make if they decided to act.
Your point on Schelling is correct, particular in relation to the central question of Iran. However, it's important to note that it was the best of a bad set of options. All the wargames prior to the conflict suggested that an escalation to total war with the Regime would lead to the mutually assured destruction of oil exports from the region. Conversely, the decision not to act would have ultimately led to the Iran Regime becoming the de facto regional hegemon, able to cut off vital supplies to anyone they dislike and, through the possession of the chokehold, apply pressure globally.
Schelling in relation to Iran iwas bad option only made palatable by the recognition that the other two options were far worse in likely outcomes.
Bottom line: maximum pressure was the least worst of a bad set of alternatives and future outcomes. It's also worth noting that by constructing a missile and drone shield, and achieving control of the Strait, Iran would then be in a position to complete the other aspects of their nuclear program, consolidating on the technically tricky nuclear missile delivery system they developed after the JCPOA agreement.
Most people get sidetracked on this issue. They immediately argue the merits of the case of whether Iran would engage in a Tel Aviv first strike option. Given the existence of proxies, the belief of the Iran Regime that these forces are extensions of their own sovereignty, and Israel's own implacable position that they have the right to destroy proxies when they are attacked, the main risk was always going to be escalatory in nature. Overall, the escalatory risk of a nuclear armed Iran, paired with the escalatory risk of a nuclear armed Israel, is probably higher than the escalatory risk of all the other nuclear armed powers in the world combined.
Schelling in relation to Iran was a bad option only made somewhat less unpalatable by the recognition that the two other main options were far worse in terms of outcomes.
Overall, restraint should be treated more as a variable rather than as a creed.
"America knew that a far larger flare up was coming at some point along the road."
I disagree, there was no evidence that Iran had the intention to attack US interest, nor close the strait, or impose any toll both taxes on it.
All the evidence available to us suggests that Iran did not intend to pursue nuclear weapons, including US intelligence assessments. That path was shut down by Khamenei's fatwa, which specifically forbade the creation of a nuclear weapon. He did not forbid research into it, which is a nuance. I'd argue their strategy of nuclear ambiguity has been an outright failure, ensuring continued attacks by Israel and their proxies.
A first strike against Israel by Iran is a fantastical theory, but extremely unlikely, it assumes that Iran was looking for nuclear weapons not for defense, but for offense, and that the regime did not mind having a hundred Israeli nukes rain down on it (plus whatever the US would send). Twelver Shiias they may be, but they don't appear to be suicidal.
This is the problem with Realism - it assumes every competitor is out to annihilate you, yet sometimes all they want is to be left alone. All empirical evidence points to Western interference as the cause of the problems in the Middle East since Sykes-Picot onwards. That the current regime in Iran came to power because of the mis-management of a US installed puppet is deeply ironic.
The West has proven itself uniquely incompetent in managing Middle Eastern affairs, history suggests we either occupy it all, or get out and let these people organise themselves.
"All the evidence available to us suggests that Iran did not intend to pursue nuclear weapons, including US intelligence assessments. That path was shut down by Khamenei's fatwa"
Wrong on two counts: 1) Iran enriched large amounts of uranium to 60%, which has no commercial use whatsoever and is only useful for another run through the centrifuge cascade to get 90% enriched, than is, bomb-grade uranium 235. The huge effort in expense in producing this 60% enriched uranium are glaring proof of a large state-directed effort to produce nuclear weapons.
2) Shiite jurisprudence requires fatwas to be published and available for study by senior Shiite scholars. There is no record of Khomeini's "nuclear weapons fatwa" being published anywhere, unlike his fatwa against Salman Rushdie. The whole "nuclear weapons fatwa" has been a public-relations effort to fool gullible Westerners into inaction.
Us Intelligence assessments agree with me, they were overruled, but there is no indication that Iran was planning to take the final step. And I've clearly stated that their nuclear ambiguity policy is a total failure, but that was/is their policy.
There's an interesting asymmetry here. If the Iran Conflict is determined by an American domestic political agenda then America loses. If, however, it's about material and resources, then Iran loses because China doesn't have the resource resilience that America does and this ultimately forces Iran to the negotiating table on terms favourable to America. The reason why China has the leverage is because strategic alignment with China is existential for Iran.
Here's the thing, provided oil and gas supply doesn't bite too deep into China's economy and function as a state, then the Chinese actually benefits from America and Iran being in conflict. However, there is a threshold, probably at some point next year, when reduced energy supply to China could become something which causes permanent or semi-permanent damage to China and its trajectory. Conversely, America is far better placed to weather the storm- at least from the point of view of resources, if not the broader economy.
Plus, it would be a major coup for China on the world stage if they manage to get Iran to concede all or most of the sticking points. Personally, I see the proxies as the big sticking point. America is constrained by Israel on this issue. Opening the Strait toll-free is doable. Similarly, Iran loses nothing in terms of face if they concede weapons inspects and somewhat limit their missile program, because they can always argue they were never intent on possessing nuclear weapons anyway:)
The proxies are the sticking point. Only China has the leverage to convince them to stop funding, training and equipping the proxies, although the funding will likely continue using covert means. Plus, they'll be desperate by then. Iran doesn't care about the hardships of their own people. But the point at which things begin to bite is when the living standards of the Artesh and their families are precarious enough for the Regime to worry about their loyalty.
So far this issue isn't critical. There have been instances of sustained non-payment of military personnel. Desertion or absence specifically among career (non-conscript) Artesh personnel are up. The regime is increasingly relying on using IRGC/Basij economic privileges or direct financial inducements to keep the security apparatus loyal. If I was American or Israeli intelligence I would be looking closely at ETKA (Etka / اتکا) it's a cooperative retail organisation associated with Iran's armed forces. As soon as the shelves aren't stocked that's when officers and NCOs will start refusing orders en masse.
It's pretty likely to happen. The question is when?
When there was actually a possibility of actually ratifying an agreement which guaranteed Iran adopting the position on sea trade that is a global universal norm, (with the small exception of the Bosphorus, which has treaty provisions which are almost identical to Regimes of Passage), Iran refused to ratify. Then there were the eighties tanker wars in the Persian Gulf, and Reagan's responses of Operation Earnest Will and Preying Mantis.
Besides, we can take Iran's own sentiments on the matter. Iran has repeatedly stated that the strait is subject only to the innocent-passage regime and that it may require prior permission or coordination, particularly for foreign naval vessels. It has rejected or limited the idea that unrestricted transit passage applies as a matter of customary law binding on it. That's a rejection of the lawful framework for international trade and freedom of passage.
There is also the asymmetry of reciprocity. Iran has perpetrated atrocities continuously against multiple countries across the Middle East. Not just Israel. Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria. More recently Bahrain. These actions are illegal and tantamount to holding sovereign states hostage to Iran's influence. In these circumstances sanctions are legitimate although a complete blockade is more debatable. Meanwhile, Iran has threatened to cut off all oil supply through the Straits as a reprisal for lawful sanctions with legitimate grounds. These are documented past actions which predate the current conflict.
172 countries are party to UNCLOS. Iran is the rare exception of being a signatory but not a party.
Then there is the drone and missile build up. Missiles are legitimate weapons suitable for retaliatory strikes against aggressors, but considerable portions of Iran's drone fleet are specifically designed in such a way that their only feasible target is the Strait and the infrastructure of Iran's neighbours. These aren't the arsenal decisions of anything other than a bully and an aggressor. A favourable interpretation might only consider the drone fleets a leveraging tool, but that wasn't the interpretation reached by either the more politically neutral elements of the American military or the institutional Washington foreign policy establishment, both of which had tacitly long acknowledged the likelihood Iran would make a play for the Strait given the right circumstances and enough military power.
A cursory examination of Iran's missile program after the JCPOA agreement quickly shows that Iran didn't abandon it's nuclear ambitions, it simply switched tack to focus on aspects of nuclear weapons which are technically more difficult to deliver from an engineering perspective. The weaponization and the delivery system. The Khorramshahr missile is specifically capable of delivering a nuclear payload. It's based upon a North Korean system which in turn is based upon a Russian system. The first test firing of a Khorramshahr was in January 2017. It represented the culmination of several years work aimed at achieving a component of nuclear capability. The best sources on the subject are the IISS in London, the ISW and the PISM in Poland.
Whatever the fatwa claimed the physical reality contradicts it. Actions speak louder than words.
You're confusing Realism with Neocon- two entirely different schools of geopolitical thought. Realism represents the pragmatic reality of the world. Neocon thinking interprets every action or gesture as potentially hostile. Liberal internationalism assumes the opposite. Realism expects the actual motives of a nation to fall somewhere in the spectrum between and seeks a empirical and rational view of the world, dominated by neither aggressive cynicism nor optimism pursued to the point of naivety. More Westerners should read Kishore Mahbubani to understand how the world actually works. The propositions of Realism is twofold. First, don't infer intentions from rhetoric when interests, capabilities and behaviour provide better evidence. Second, don't assume either benevolence or malignity in advance, although past and current actions are a reasonable guide.
I largely agree with your historical assessment of the problem, but knowing how the past informs the present doesn't really with how to resolve the current situation, besides which it's worth noting that although the Shah often employed exceedingly harsh methods against dissidents and opponents real progress was being made, it just wasn't leading to change at a fast enough pace to satisfy the activist interests within Iran. That being said, material living standards improvements and opportunities were improving at a faster pace than either the government he displaced or the Revolution which displaced him.
I also don't disagree with you about Sykes-Picot, but would qualify that many of the problems which affect the Middle East are far more dependent in origin on the previous Ottoman Empire, which used tyrannical force to first encourage the movement of deeply culturally incompatible to move closer to each other and then used draconian coercion to maintain peace.
Ok. So I'm never going to prove tolls as an intention, that falls into the category of well-founded suspicion, but the case for both threats and actions against the Strait were well documented before the conflict.
I understand an sympathise with your principled non-interventionalism. I myself was against the Iraq war. However, the Strait changes the calculus. It's simply too important to the world in terms of trade and the humanitarian requirements of fertiliser production to be left to the diktats of a brutally oppressive Regime which has shown every intention of becoming a regional hegemon. And they not simply against Israel and America.
It's not unfair to see the West's system as exploitative, but whilst the rejection of said exploitation might feel good, there is no reliable alternative for providing the sustainable mechanism for economic development and tolerable living standards. Iran's revised underlying conception of international political and economic order for the world is one of unremitting misery across a whole host of domains.
Most people don't realise just how fine-tuned the world needs to be across a whole set of independent criteria in order to produce even a modicum of abundance to mitigate the fragile state of the natural human economic condition. What's worse is that we exist precariously above several layers of jury-rigged and optimised systems. Starting from scratch isn't really an option. Neither is revolutionary change. The only revolutions which ever really worked were those which changed the landlords.
"Iran has repeatedly stated that the strait is subject only to the innocent-passage regime "
This was actually Oman's argument, and there is precedent in the Montreux Convention for innocent passage regime.
While Iran didn't ratify UNCLOS it has signed it - the US has not, it considers itself above the law.
The Strait is 100% Omani and Iranian territorial waters.
The legal question when it comes to tolls is not extremely clear, they can't arbitrarily close it or just toll booth it, but if they are being attacked they do have the right to defend their sovereign seas against aggression. Ie they can mine the strait to prevent US warships, they can not mine the strait to prevent civilian passage.
The Tanker Wars were part of the Iraq-Iran war, which is important context, which the US got involved in and egged Iraq on.
I am confused by your response. Evidence or no evidence, why would any power choose not to act in its own best interest? Forget the nukes for a sec. We know that Iran has been cultivating and arming regional proxies for years. We know they have been mass producing cheap drones. We know they believe they have complete sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. We know that they have repeatedly stated that they want to wipe the Zionist entity off the map. Even if that is irrelevant to everyone outside of Israel, surely we must all acknowledge that such a comprehensive act of aggression would cause an immense amount of regional instability in the most economically vital region on earth. If they did not ever wish to project power at some point in time, they would not have pursued or supported even one of these policies listed above (and…yes…now we can mention enriching that ol’ uranium too): the fact that they have pursued all of them makes their strategic intent unambiguously clear, except to the willfully obtuse.
It's not in their own interest to start a nuclear war, and before this year's war, there was sufficient uncertainty about the cost of seizing control of the Strait, and uncertainty about the gains, to prevent them doing that just for the sake of it - if you don't know the full cost of seizing control of the Strait you don't do it just because. They didn't have a reason to, and the costs were unclear. It was, in other words, but in their interest to close the Strait just for the fun of it.
Iran's regime are well educated, they understand action and reaction.
Now the entire world, apart from the US and Israel, blames not Iran but Netanyahu and Trump, for the Strait being closed, because while most of the world despises the regime, they're also not very fond of the US/Israel, and they see their war of choice as unjust.
Iran understands that they have to avoid antagonising their allies, they understand that they should avoid antagonising Europe, and India and Tűrkiye.
They don't claim complete sovereignty, they acknowledge that Oman shares the Strait.
And according to international law the Strait is entirely in the territorial waters of those two nations, they own it. Right of passage has been claimed for all ships, which may well be the law, but it is undoubtedly their territorial waters.
They've used Israel and the US as boogeymen for internal purposes for decades, and Israel is a convenient enemy to have when Iran is competing with Saudi for leadership of the Umma.
And all this talk of nukes, Israel has since the 1990ies claimed that Iran was just around the corner, just a few months or weeks away, for at least three decades that has been Netanyahu's mantra - where are the nukes?
After close to 40 years of these warnings I tend to not take them seriously, especially when reality shows there are no nukes, and the US intelligence establishment as late as June this year says they have no viable weapon design and are not even pursuing such a thing.
I think, personally, that their policy is idiotic, sure to invite attacks again and again, sure to keep sanctions going, and i don't understand their reasoning. Either build the nukes and gain immunity, or give them up already, this strategy of nuclear ambiguity is not smart in my book.
You’re ignoring a mountain of evidence - and bodies- and concluding there’s no evidence.
GJ refuted in detail, I’ll add Iran certainly struck Israel through Proxies very hard.
As to managing their affairs, other than endemic warfare in the region or a brutal hegemony none managed their affairs. BTW prior to 10/7/2023 the Obama and Biden administrations spent over a decade trying to court and indeed raise Iran as regional partner of a sort especially in Lebanon, Trump fashioned the Abraham accords of Gulf Nations detente with Israel to which Iran responded with 10/7/23 massacres and everyone had enough. The bigger flare coming not mentioned was nuclear weapons held by Iran, the only point of enriching Uranium past 3-7% exactly being nuclear weapons. Iran reached 60% and was close to 90%. A crude bomb is feasible at 60%. As for the strait being closed that’s been tried before and failed, it’s failing mostly now. Land pipelines and routes around, minesweeper and escorts have largely thwarted Iran’s attempts to close or extort. Iran is mostly harming its key ally China.
Important to note that even before the decapitation Iran did not have unitary government or full internal control in Iran as they are trying to be a country, a theocracy, part democracy, part revolutionary exporter to their Shia neighbors, part proxy sponsor and part IGRC Oligarchy as the IGRC has 60% of their economy; Iran was internally unstable, kept together only by force and money to internal repression organs and that unstable mix cannot have nuclear weapons even without a millenarian apocalyptic vision- which the IGRC and the Theocrats do. Put God+Nukes+Instability and control slipping and you’ll have nuclear war in the region and it might spread.
Evidence from US intelligence services, the IAEA and others - there is no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear bomb, and plenty of evidence that they were adhering to Khamenei's fatwa. This is a very powerful religious ruling, not something they'd throw away willy nilly - if for no other reason than legitimacy in the Shia world.
Before Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, and told the Iranians in clear terms that deals mean nothing, there was no enrichment.
You're mixing in a lot of vibes here. What Iran can technically do, and what it does, are not the same things. Did you know that US nuclear subs run on uranium enriched to 93%? While there aren't many legitimate uses for such uranium, there are some, and for the Iranians that has been 'nuclear ambiguity' - this is well known, but it doesn't fit the narrative and gets swept under the rug. A failed policy for sure, but still a policy.
The Strait has been closed exactly once before, well semi-closed, during the Iran-Iraq war that the US started, and it caused a lot of problems.
Pipelines are not helping the Saudis a lot, as witnessed by recent events, pipes and pumping stations are easy targets.
China paused oil purchases and only recently restarted, they're willing to suffer to weaken the US.
The IRGC controlled roughly 30% of the Iranian economy, not 60.
Iran was not, and is not, particularly unstable, that is wishful thinking spread by the Israelis. Khamenei senior balanced the factions well, whether his son can do the same I do not know, their actions and talk after the decapitation suggests that some pragmatism is being considered. Iran is a web of clans, families, tribes, interests - the clerics and the IRGC sit as separate entities but are permeated by the same clans/tribes etc. Many of these families/clans/tribes stretch into Syria and Lebanon - ties that bind them together.
It's incredibly complex, as Yemen is.
The US/Israeli war has strengthened national unity.
Yes the IRGC and the Basij are hated, but the people still see themselves as Iranians, as Persians.
Empirical evidence suggests that Iran is most of all concerned with it's own security, regime survival, and Shia/Sunni power struggle with Saudi Arabia.
They're not suicidal, they're not going to first strike Israel, they are theocrats but they are not morons- most of them are highly educated, not Taliban religious education, real education in sciences and literature - the classical educations.
The rhetoric on Israel and the US is mostly for internal use, toned down in good times and ramped up in bad.
Ironic that a lot of what you're saying applies to the US now, oligarchic power, theocratic leadership, millennarian apocalyptic sects have infected large parts of government, including the SecDef who believes in the end times and advocates holy war. I mean, evangelical support for Israel has nothing to do with protecting Jews or 'our ally' - it's about bringing about Armageddon - literally. They actually want them all killed while they get ruptured, and the Israelis are well aware of this.
Right. At least we have clarified where we both stand. In my opinion, Iran is the far worse option under any circumstance. (And, as a Greek-American, allow me some cynicism on the reliability of Turkey as a stabilizing power in the region.)
Everyone seems to forget the US went to war with the Houthis for two months last year and lost. I’m sure Saudi Arabia, with the world‘s worst military, will mop them right up.
I'm surprised that a small country, or faction that relies on food imports can't be easily defeated. Cutting off imports by destroying the limited port facilities available to the Houthis would be effective. Israel took out part of the port facilities. Seems that completing the job could incapacitate the Houthis. Yes, civilians would suffer. However, civilians carry a responsibility for the actions of the government that they serve. Germany and Japan were defeated because their economies were defeated. North Vietnam was not defeated because their ecomony was left untouched.
"War is the remedy that our enemies have chosen, and I say let us give them all they want." -- William Sherman
The United States couldn’t defeat the Houthis when they want to war last year. They called it ‘operation rough rider’ and it lasted 2 months. In the end, they cut a deal and walked away. Despite the money, Saudi has a terrible military, vulnerable infrastructure, and a lot of division between the palace and the tribes. The Houthis are far more likely to topple the Saudi Government.
There is an absence of criticism regarding the Saudis.
We've supported them militarily and in many other ways yet they don't seem to want to get their bright and shiny U.S. military equipment or U.S. trained military involved in actual combat operations.
The Houthis are on the Saudi border and now are jeopardizing Saudi access to the Red Sea yet the House of Saud seems more interested in enjoying the good life in NYC, London and Dubai than in dealing with attacks on their sovereignty for fear of angering Shiites in the region.
Thanks for your perspective and valuable insight. Historically, not many have managed to conquer Yemenis. Sadly, current developments in the region are showing signs of extended disruption and regional uncertainty
KSA will fall before Ansarallah. You speak of economic pressure but that has never worked against Iran and Yemen has almost no economy to speak of. They are 100% committed and will not stop fighting until they are martyred or victorious. Contrast that with the decadent Saudis. They cannot withstand a single season of economic pressure and they must hire proxies to fight their wars. MBS betrayed the tribes and stopped paying them off. Ansarallah marched to Mokha. IRGC and Ansarallah do not need a functioning economy to keep Hormuz and bab Al mandeb closed long enough to blow up $1T of derivative trades rested on the energy markets. Watch markets crash and regimes fall. IRGC can control the news cycle so they can control markets. They saw Trump and cronies do this now the game is clear for anyone to see. Next move is to cut fiber optic cables. This will happen at the most consequential moment possible. All GCC will fall as their power was built on sands that have shifted. The rule through patronage and brutality. Israel will not save them either, Israel will see them burn! Any moment Israel can bomb Iran and Iran will send GCC energy production back a decade. Dark times await us.
It was ok until the analysis on Iran.... I don't really want to say what is what, but the argument you make is excellent on China if factual, but the supply lines and finances are a bit more complex.... Just a bit more work and you will be there.... sorry
Trouble is America has its fingers in too many pies and thus it is virtually impossible for America to focus on one thing. I have read that anti-Houthi efforts clashed with anti -ISIS effort even when Houthis were presenting bigger threat.
The headline lured me in, but I feel that the article is missing a huge piece of the puzzle, which 'the long warred' alludes to in their comment. This article looks at the external factors, but I feel internal factors are missing. Yemeni politics are extremely complex, the tribe and tribal confederations play a huge part.
Without taking into account why the Houthis are able to maintain cohesion, any analysis will be missing a crucial part. Cohesion doesn't come from centralized command, it comes from trust, clear orders, strong deals between tribes, balanced tribal power - in some ways this started when the Zaydi royals were deposed in '62, they've been trying to take back power ever since, and by not including them in the larger national project the Sunni government sowed the seeds of the Houthi insurgency. Saudi interference hasn't helped.
The Houthis can't be defeated without taking into account what is a Houthi, why does the Houthi have strength, what does the Houthi want, and what can the Houthi offer the non-Houthi Yemenite.
The Houthis are a family/clan/tribe, with a long history, their initial fight was against mis-management by the government and Saudi interference.
Iran is a part of this for sure, and Iran is probably going to prioritize the Houthis over other aligned movements, because the Houthis give Iran something none of the others do - power over Saudi Arabia and the US.
While they're Iran aligned and allied, they're not puppets, and have shown pragmatism when needed, such as the 2025 war which resulted in a deal with the US - which Trump seems to want to adhere to.
I would also like to push back against the often used term "ragtag", often accompanied by "in flip flops" and so on. This tendency to use verbiage that implies they are disorganized, poorly supplied and poorly trained, prevents proper analysis and leads to underestimation of their strength and sophistication.
The term 'terrorist group' - while alarming, creates an image of a limited group of terrorists, not a cohesive, centrally controlled, army that can call on perhaps as many as 350 000 fighters (altho most are less trained that the core cadres, and may not be as ideological, they will follow their tribal elders and fight the Sunnis when asked).
You could use the same verbiage about the Afghans - a people who defeated three vast empires with access to all the most modern technology, and remain standing.
Their core armed leadership are sophisticated warriors, who know how to manage their tribal alliances and griefs, with access to a wide range of technologies that they know how to use.
These are hard men, from a hard land, and what they want is mostly to control their own country, which is also what the UAE aligned militias (STC) wanted (and still want, which is why SA pushed the UAE out). The fight is over which faction/clan should rule, along with the usual Sunni/Shiia divide, and opposition to Saleh's decades of corruption and mismanagement - all of which may, or may not, be overcome with clever leadership.
The internationally recognized govt in Yemen is run from hotel rooms in Riyadh, their policy more or less dictated by MBS. Their forces are not a cohesive Yemeni army, infighting, tribalism, factionalism and warring for positions, as well as the remote control from Saudi Arabia, reduces it's fighting strength. Simply put - Yemeni govt forces are not particularly loyal to the government for the most part, but to their clan/tribe and that tribal leader. It's an incredibly complex web of alliances, tribalism, personal connections and so on (as are SA's armed forces, which is why it may not be a great a fighting force as one may think).
As long as Saudi Arabia continues their heavy handed meddling, or downright dictation, this will continue.
I say this not to defend the Houthis, but to highlight that local conditions apply, and to warn against underestimating them, or overestimating what can be achieved with modern tech and sanctions. Without solving the under lying problem caused by SA and unification, there will be more fighting.
Trump could have prevented the fall of Mocha, but chose not to. The reasons why are not known, but the American are on record saying that there's no problem with oil, the US can supply everyone..
He's held to the 2025 deal, and CENTCOM is most likely running out of spare ammo that can be used against them, in addition to not wanting to provoke attacks on Red Sea shipping.
If the Houthis want to take Aden, and succeed, which seems likely without US intervention, then they will control the most populated areas, and of course, the Suez canal through their control of Bab a-Mandeb.
My assessment is that at this time, we may want to see if the Houthis are willing to take a pragmatic view of the world and mimic al-Sharaa - if they do, they may bring stability to country that has suffered immensely over the past decades.
By not taking SA's side we may prevent Twelver Shiism (from Iran) and Wahabbism (from SA) from taking over Yemen, which may, in the fullness of time, be for the better.
You're right, ragtag is selling the Houthis short -- and terrorist is needlessly inflammatory. Calling them cavemen is explaining why they're hard to destroy -- at least the surviving Houthis. They continue to be quite capable engineers, and their favorite book is Snowcrash.
The Houthis are supported by Iran, and their taking of Makha and the islands are long term problems for Trump and the United States. All in all, free trade is in peril. The Strait of Malacca is far more of a danger than either of the small straits in the ME, of course.
Trump with his Golden Dome is already planning for an America that is no longer the World's Navy.
Schelling doesn’t work - incremental escalation and “pressure “ and “raising the costs” doesn’t work. We tried this in Vietnam and abandoned it as this nonsense emboldened the enemy. Since 1945 American foreign policy has not understood that wars are not negotiations and business deals by other means. This has repeatedly led us into endemic conflict which we are completely unsuited for and exhausts our people’s support, not to mention breaks the military. In truth in that region one conflict is always replaced by another. Peace can only be imposed by overwhelming and ruthless force including what is now called genocide, we 🇺🇸 have no need nor stomach for such measures. We 🇺🇸 are inconvenienced, others more interested and not hampered (China) may ultimately take a hand. We 🇺🇸 have oil and China doesn’t.
We’re withdrawing. Morocco you know abuts the Atlantic and Europe, Yemen and the rest do not…
Great comment. It's nice to see somebody arguing about geopolitics on a more informed basis. Although there is always a tendency to veer off towards the naive idiocy of the liberal internationalists or default back into Neocon overcommitments, it's my hope that over time America will shift more towards the realism school. Most analyses tend to break realism down into specific branches: pragmatic realism, restrained realism, and primacist realism.
I think that's a mistake. I think these are actually revealed preferences in players which are actually a set of controls with feedback metrics relating to very particular and individual scenarios. For example, although restraint is a preference it can also be a genuine recognition of the situation and conditions on the ground. The key questions should be in areas like how much of the burden can we shunt off to those who should be dealing with the issue themselves? What are the likely counter factual outcomes if we tweak the restraint dial? How does gross action or the failure to act affect our standing in relation to other points of friction, tension, and potential conflict? To what extent does action in a particular arena draw down upon an already depleted reserve of the American public's patience for further military or materiel commitments?
Every pressure point should be considered in its specifics. Applying a generalised standard across arenas is the first error. The second is sunk costs, as well as the recognition that apparent upfront costs might only represent a downpayment on a far larger commitment.
I think two mistakes in analyses have been made in relation to Iran. First, the illusion of choice. America knew that a far larger flare up was coming at some point along the road. The drone and missile build up was an indicator of the intent to attempt to exercise a veto and tolls on the Strait at a later date. One can quibble about the timeline and argue that there was a small chance that the Iran Regime wouldn't make the play by 2035, but this ignores the fact that ideologically they saw control of the Strait as their right, rather than an infringement on the rights of others to a Regime of Passage unmolested.
In this light, it becomes apparent that American thinking was caught up in the framework of inevitability with a timeline- whether to commit to conflict when relative strengths were favourable, or when they were less favourable at a later date, potentially when political will was lacking. The second analytical error was in failing to recognise the level of commitment required. I don't think the Trump Admin recognised the level of commitment they would be required to make if they decided to act.
Your point on Schelling is correct, particular in relation to the central question of Iran. However, it's important to note that it was the best of a bad set of options. All the wargames prior to the conflict suggested that an escalation to total war with the Regime would lead to the mutually assured destruction of oil exports from the region. Conversely, the decision not to act would have ultimately led to the Iran Regime becoming the de facto regional hegemon, able to cut off vital supplies to anyone they dislike and, through the possession of the chokehold, apply pressure globally.
Schelling in relation to Iran iwas bad option only made palatable by the recognition that the other two options were far worse in likely outcomes.
Bottom line: maximum pressure was the least worst of a bad set of alternatives and future outcomes. It's also worth noting that by constructing a missile and drone shield, and achieving control of the Strait, Iran would then be in a position to complete the other aspects of their nuclear program, consolidating on the technically tricky nuclear missile delivery system they developed after the JCPOA agreement.
Most people get sidetracked on this issue. They immediately argue the merits of the case of whether Iran would engage in a Tel Aviv first strike option. Given the existence of proxies, the belief of the Iran Regime that these forces are extensions of their own sovereignty, and Israel's own implacable position that they have the right to destroy proxies when they are attacked, the main risk was always going to be escalatory in nature. Overall, the escalatory risk of a nuclear armed Iran, paired with the escalatory risk of a nuclear armed Israel, is probably higher than the escalatory risk of all the other nuclear armed powers in the world combined.
Schelling in relation to Iran was a bad option only made somewhat less unpalatable by the recognition that the two other main options were far worse in terms of outcomes.
Overall, restraint should be treated more as a variable rather than as a creed.
"America knew that a far larger flare up was coming at some point along the road."
I disagree, there was no evidence that Iran had the intention to attack US interest, nor close the strait, or impose any toll both taxes on it.
All the evidence available to us suggests that Iran did not intend to pursue nuclear weapons, including US intelligence assessments. That path was shut down by Khamenei's fatwa, which specifically forbade the creation of a nuclear weapon. He did not forbid research into it, which is a nuance. I'd argue their strategy of nuclear ambiguity has been an outright failure, ensuring continued attacks by Israel and their proxies.
A first strike against Israel by Iran is a fantastical theory, but extremely unlikely, it assumes that Iran was looking for nuclear weapons not for defense, but for offense, and that the regime did not mind having a hundred Israeli nukes rain down on it (plus whatever the US would send). Twelver Shiias they may be, but they don't appear to be suicidal.
This is the problem with Realism - it assumes every competitor is out to annihilate you, yet sometimes all they want is to be left alone. All empirical evidence points to Western interference as the cause of the problems in the Middle East since Sykes-Picot onwards. That the current regime in Iran came to power because of the mis-management of a US installed puppet is deeply ironic.
The West has proven itself uniquely incompetent in managing Middle Eastern affairs, history suggests we either occupy it all, or get out and let these people organise themselves.
"All the evidence available to us suggests that Iran did not intend to pursue nuclear weapons, including US intelligence assessments. That path was shut down by Khamenei's fatwa"
Wrong on two counts: 1) Iran enriched large amounts of uranium to 60%, which has no commercial use whatsoever and is only useful for another run through the centrifuge cascade to get 90% enriched, than is, bomb-grade uranium 235. The huge effort in expense in producing this 60% enriched uranium are glaring proof of a large state-directed effort to produce nuclear weapons.
2) Shiite jurisprudence requires fatwas to be published and available for study by senior Shiite scholars. There is no record of Khomeini's "nuclear weapons fatwa" being published anywhere, unlike his fatwa against Salman Rushdie. The whole "nuclear weapons fatwa" has been a public-relations effort to fool gullible Westerners into inaction.
Wow. Great point (point 2).
He seems to have considered them haram, and published that opinion. Afaik he never rescinded it.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150708040618/http://farsi.khamenei.ir/treatise-content?id=228#2790
Us Intelligence assessments agree with me, they were overruled, but there is no indication that Iran was planning to take the final step. And I've clearly stated that their nuclear ambiguity policy is a total failure, but that was/is their policy.
Do we need to consider China’s role here? My sense is that a great deal of the current stress in west Asia is driven by China.
There's an interesting asymmetry here. If the Iran Conflict is determined by an American domestic political agenda then America loses. If, however, it's about material and resources, then Iran loses because China doesn't have the resource resilience that America does and this ultimately forces Iran to the negotiating table on terms favourable to America. The reason why China has the leverage is because strategic alignment with China is existential for Iran.
Here's the thing, provided oil and gas supply doesn't bite too deep into China's economy and function as a state, then the Chinese actually benefits from America and Iran being in conflict. However, there is a threshold, probably at some point next year, when reduced energy supply to China could become something which causes permanent or semi-permanent damage to China and its trajectory. Conversely, America is far better placed to weather the storm- at least from the point of view of resources, if not the broader economy.
Plus, it would be a major coup for China on the world stage if they manage to get Iran to concede all or most of the sticking points. Personally, I see the proxies as the big sticking point. America is constrained by Israel on this issue. Opening the Strait toll-free is doable. Similarly, Iran loses nothing in terms of face if they concede weapons inspects and somewhat limit their missile program, because they can always argue they were never intent on possessing nuclear weapons anyway:)
The proxies are the sticking point. Only China has the leverage to convince them to stop funding, training and equipping the proxies, although the funding will likely continue using covert means. Plus, they'll be desperate by then. Iran doesn't care about the hardships of their own people. But the point at which things begin to bite is when the living standards of the Artesh and their families are precarious enough for the Regime to worry about their loyalty.
So far this issue isn't critical. There have been instances of sustained non-payment of military personnel. Desertion or absence specifically among career (non-conscript) Artesh personnel are up. The regime is increasingly relying on using IRGC/Basij economic privileges or direct financial inducements to keep the security apparatus loyal. If I was American or Israeli intelligence I would be looking closely at ETKA (Etka / اتکا) it's a cooperative retail organisation associated with Iran's armed forces. As soon as the shelves aren't stocked that's when officers and NCOs will start refusing orders en masse.
It's pretty likely to happen. The question is when?
When there was actually a possibility of actually ratifying an agreement which guaranteed Iran adopting the position on sea trade that is a global universal norm, (with the small exception of the Bosphorus, which has treaty provisions which are almost identical to Regimes of Passage), Iran refused to ratify. Then there were the eighties tanker wars in the Persian Gulf, and Reagan's responses of Operation Earnest Will and Preying Mantis.
Besides, we can take Iran's own sentiments on the matter. Iran has repeatedly stated that the strait is subject only to the innocent-passage regime and that it may require prior permission or coordination, particularly for foreign naval vessels. It has rejected or limited the idea that unrestricted transit passage applies as a matter of customary law binding on it. That's a rejection of the lawful framework for international trade and freedom of passage.
There is also the asymmetry of reciprocity. Iran has perpetrated atrocities continuously against multiple countries across the Middle East. Not just Israel. Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria. More recently Bahrain. These actions are illegal and tantamount to holding sovereign states hostage to Iran's influence. In these circumstances sanctions are legitimate although a complete blockade is more debatable. Meanwhile, Iran has threatened to cut off all oil supply through the Straits as a reprisal for lawful sanctions with legitimate grounds. These are documented past actions which predate the current conflict.
172 countries are party to UNCLOS. Iran is the rare exception of being a signatory but not a party.
Then there is the drone and missile build up. Missiles are legitimate weapons suitable for retaliatory strikes against aggressors, but considerable portions of Iran's drone fleet are specifically designed in such a way that their only feasible target is the Strait and the infrastructure of Iran's neighbours. These aren't the arsenal decisions of anything other than a bully and an aggressor. A favourable interpretation might only consider the drone fleets a leveraging tool, but that wasn't the interpretation reached by either the more politically neutral elements of the American military or the institutional Washington foreign policy establishment, both of which had tacitly long acknowledged the likelihood Iran would make a play for the Strait given the right circumstances and enough military power.
A cursory examination of Iran's missile program after the JCPOA agreement quickly shows that Iran didn't abandon it's nuclear ambitions, it simply switched tack to focus on aspects of nuclear weapons which are technically more difficult to deliver from an engineering perspective. The weaponization and the delivery system. The Khorramshahr missile is specifically capable of delivering a nuclear payload. It's based upon a North Korean system which in turn is based upon a Russian system. The first test firing of a Khorramshahr was in January 2017. It represented the culmination of several years work aimed at achieving a component of nuclear capability. The best sources on the subject are the IISS in London, the ISW and the PISM in Poland.
Whatever the fatwa claimed the physical reality contradicts it. Actions speak louder than words.
You're confusing Realism with Neocon- two entirely different schools of geopolitical thought. Realism represents the pragmatic reality of the world. Neocon thinking interprets every action or gesture as potentially hostile. Liberal internationalism assumes the opposite. Realism expects the actual motives of a nation to fall somewhere in the spectrum between and seeks a empirical and rational view of the world, dominated by neither aggressive cynicism nor optimism pursued to the point of naivety. More Westerners should read Kishore Mahbubani to understand how the world actually works. The propositions of Realism is twofold. First, don't infer intentions from rhetoric when interests, capabilities and behaviour provide better evidence. Second, don't assume either benevolence or malignity in advance, although past and current actions are a reasonable guide.
I largely agree with your historical assessment of the problem, but knowing how the past informs the present doesn't really with how to resolve the current situation, besides which it's worth noting that although the Shah often employed exceedingly harsh methods against dissidents and opponents real progress was being made, it just wasn't leading to change at a fast enough pace to satisfy the activist interests within Iran. That being said, material living standards improvements and opportunities were improving at a faster pace than either the government he displaced or the Revolution which displaced him.
I also don't disagree with you about Sykes-Picot, but would qualify that many of the problems which affect the Middle East are far more dependent in origin on the previous Ottoman Empire, which used tyrannical force to first encourage the movement of deeply culturally incompatible to move closer to each other and then used draconian coercion to maintain peace.
Ok. So I'm never going to prove tolls as an intention, that falls into the category of well-founded suspicion, but the case for both threats and actions against the Strait were well documented before the conflict.
I understand an sympathise with your principled non-interventionalism. I myself was against the Iraq war. However, the Strait changes the calculus. It's simply too important to the world in terms of trade and the humanitarian requirements of fertiliser production to be left to the diktats of a brutally oppressive Regime which has shown every intention of becoming a regional hegemon. And they not simply against Israel and America.
It's not unfair to see the West's system as exploitative, but whilst the rejection of said exploitation might feel good, there is no reliable alternative for providing the sustainable mechanism for economic development and tolerable living standards. Iran's revised underlying conception of international political and economic order for the world is one of unremitting misery across a whole host of domains.
Most people don't realise just how fine-tuned the world needs to be across a whole set of independent criteria in order to produce even a modicum of abundance to mitigate the fragile state of the natural human economic condition. What's worse is that we exist precariously above several layers of jury-rigged and optimised systems. Starting from scratch isn't really an option. Neither is revolutionary change. The only revolutions which ever really worked were those which changed the landlords.
Just to add:
"Iran has repeatedly stated that the strait is subject only to the innocent-passage regime "
This was actually Oman's argument, and there is precedent in the Montreux Convention for innocent passage regime.
While Iran didn't ratify UNCLOS it has signed it - the US has not, it considers itself above the law.
The Strait is 100% Omani and Iranian territorial waters.
The legal question when it comes to tolls is not extremely clear, they can't arbitrarily close it or just toll booth it, but if they are being attacked they do have the right to defend their sovereign seas against aggression. Ie they can mine the strait to prevent US warships, they can not mine the strait to prevent civilian passage.
The Tanker Wars were part of the Iraq-Iran war, which is important context, which the US got involved in and egged Iraq on.
I am confused by your response. Evidence or no evidence, why would any power choose not to act in its own best interest? Forget the nukes for a sec. We know that Iran has been cultivating and arming regional proxies for years. We know they have been mass producing cheap drones. We know they believe they have complete sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. We know that they have repeatedly stated that they want to wipe the Zionist entity off the map. Even if that is irrelevant to everyone outside of Israel, surely we must all acknowledge that such a comprehensive act of aggression would cause an immense amount of regional instability in the most economically vital region on earth. If they did not ever wish to project power at some point in time, they would not have pursued or supported even one of these policies listed above (and…yes…now we can mention enriching that ol’ uranium too): the fact that they have pursued all of them makes their strategic intent unambiguously clear, except to the willfully obtuse.
It's not in their own interest to start a nuclear war, and before this year's war, there was sufficient uncertainty about the cost of seizing control of the Strait, and uncertainty about the gains, to prevent them doing that just for the sake of it - if you don't know the full cost of seizing control of the Strait you don't do it just because. They didn't have a reason to, and the costs were unclear. It was, in other words, but in their interest to close the Strait just for the fun of it.
Iran's regime are well educated, they understand action and reaction.
Now the entire world, apart from the US and Israel, blames not Iran but Netanyahu and Trump, for the Strait being closed, because while most of the world despises the regime, they're also not very fond of the US/Israel, and they see their war of choice as unjust.
Iran understands that they have to avoid antagonising their allies, they understand that they should avoid antagonising Europe, and India and Tűrkiye.
They don't claim complete sovereignty, they acknowledge that Oman shares the Strait.
And according to international law the Strait is entirely in the territorial waters of those two nations, they own it. Right of passage has been claimed for all ships, which may well be the law, but it is undoubtedly their territorial waters.
They've used Israel and the US as boogeymen for internal purposes for decades, and Israel is a convenient enemy to have when Iran is competing with Saudi for leadership of the Umma.
And all this talk of nukes, Israel has since the 1990ies claimed that Iran was just around the corner, just a few months or weeks away, for at least three decades that has been Netanyahu's mantra - where are the nukes?
After close to 40 years of these warnings I tend to not take them seriously, especially when reality shows there are no nukes, and the US intelligence establishment as late as June this year says they have no viable weapon design and are not even pursuing such a thing.
I think, personally, that their policy is idiotic, sure to invite attacks again and again, sure to keep sanctions going, and i don't understand their reasoning. Either build the nukes and gain immunity, or give them up already, this strategy of nuclear ambiguity is not smart in my book.
You’re ignoring a mountain of evidence - and bodies- and concluding there’s no evidence.
GJ refuted in detail, I’ll add Iran certainly struck Israel through Proxies very hard.
As to managing their affairs, other than endemic warfare in the region or a brutal hegemony none managed their affairs. BTW prior to 10/7/2023 the Obama and Biden administrations spent over a decade trying to court and indeed raise Iran as regional partner of a sort especially in Lebanon, Trump fashioned the Abraham accords of Gulf Nations detente with Israel to which Iran responded with 10/7/23 massacres and everyone had enough. The bigger flare coming not mentioned was nuclear weapons held by Iran, the only point of enriching Uranium past 3-7% exactly being nuclear weapons. Iran reached 60% and was close to 90%. A crude bomb is feasible at 60%. As for the strait being closed that’s been tried before and failed, it’s failing mostly now. Land pipelines and routes around, minesweeper and escorts have largely thwarted Iran’s attempts to close or extort. Iran is mostly harming its key ally China.
Important to note that even before the decapitation Iran did not have unitary government or full internal control in Iran as they are trying to be a country, a theocracy, part democracy, part revolutionary exporter to their Shia neighbors, part proxy sponsor and part IGRC Oligarchy as the IGRC has 60% of their economy; Iran was internally unstable, kept together only by force and money to internal repression organs and that unstable mix cannot have nuclear weapons even without a millenarian apocalyptic vision- which the IGRC and the Theocrats do. Put God+Nukes+Instability and control slipping and you’ll have nuclear war in the region and it might spread.
Evidence from US intelligence services, the IAEA and others - there is no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear bomb, and plenty of evidence that they were adhering to Khamenei's fatwa. This is a very powerful religious ruling, not something they'd throw away willy nilly - if for no other reason than legitimacy in the Shia world.
Before Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, and told the Iranians in clear terms that deals mean nothing, there was no enrichment.
You're mixing in a lot of vibes here. What Iran can technically do, and what it does, are not the same things. Did you know that US nuclear subs run on uranium enriched to 93%? While there aren't many legitimate uses for such uranium, there are some, and for the Iranians that has been 'nuclear ambiguity' - this is well known, but it doesn't fit the narrative and gets swept under the rug. A failed policy for sure, but still a policy.
The Strait has been closed exactly once before, well semi-closed, during the Iran-Iraq war that the US started, and it caused a lot of problems.
Pipelines are not helping the Saudis a lot, as witnessed by recent events, pipes and pumping stations are easy targets.
China paused oil purchases and only recently restarted, they're willing to suffer to weaken the US.
The IRGC controlled roughly 30% of the Iranian economy, not 60.
Iran was not, and is not, particularly unstable, that is wishful thinking spread by the Israelis. Khamenei senior balanced the factions well, whether his son can do the same I do not know, their actions and talk after the decapitation suggests that some pragmatism is being considered. Iran is a web of clans, families, tribes, interests - the clerics and the IRGC sit as separate entities but are permeated by the same clans/tribes etc. Many of these families/clans/tribes stretch into Syria and Lebanon - ties that bind them together.
It's incredibly complex, as Yemen is.
The US/Israeli war has strengthened national unity.
Yes the IRGC and the Basij are hated, but the people still see themselves as Iranians, as Persians.
Empirical evidence suggests that Iran is most of all concerned with it's own security, regime survival, and Shia/Sunni power struggle with Saudi Arabia.
They're not suicidal, they're not going to first strike Israel, they are theocrats but they are not morons- most of them are highly educated, not Taliban religious education, real education in sciences and literature - the classical educations.
The rhetoric on Israel and the US is mostly for internal use, toned down in good times and ramped up in bad.
Ironic that a lot of what you're saying applies to the US now, oligarchic power, theocratic leadership, millennarian apocalyptic sects have infected large parts of government, including the SecDef who believes in the end times and advocates holy war. I mean, evangelical support for Israel has nothing to do with protecting Jews or 'our ally' - it's about bringing about Armageddon - literally. They actually want them all killed while they get ruptured, and the Israelis are well aware of this.
Right. At least we have clarified where we both stand. In my opinion, Iran is the far worse option under any circumstance. (And, as a Greek-American, allow me some cynicism on the reliability of Turkey as a stabilizing power in the region.)
Your perspective is always unique and much appreciated.
The Houthis are weeks away from defeat, just like the Viet Cong.
Such a good analogy.
Everyone seems to forget the US went to war with the Houthis for two months last year and lost. I’m sure Saudi Arabia, with the world‘s worst military, will mop them right up.
I'm surprised that a small country, or faction that relies on food imports can't be easily defeated. Cutting off imports by destroying the limited port facilities available to the Houthis would be effective. Israel took out part of the port facilities. Seems that completing the job could incapacitate the Houthis. Yes, civilians would suffer. However, civilians carry a responsibility for the actions of the government that they serve. Germany and Japan were defeated because their economies were defeated. North Vietnam was not defeated because their ecomony was left untouched.
"War is the remedy that our enemies have chosen, and I say let us give them all they want." -- William Sherman
Hi Vaughn,
The United States couldn’t defeat the Houthis when they want to war last year. They called it ‘operation rough rider’ and it lasted 2 months. In the end, they cut a deal and walked away. Despite the money, Saudi has a terrible military, vulnerable infrastructure, and a lot of division between the palace and the tribes. The Houthis are far more likely to topple the Saudi Government.
PS: North Vietnam defeated the U.S.
There is an absence of criticism regarding the Saudis.
We've supported them militarily and in many other ways yet they don't seem to want to get their bright and shiny U.S. military equipment or U.S. trained military involved in actual combat operations.
The Houthis are on the Saudi border and now are jeopardizing Saudi access to the Red Sea yet the House of Saud seems more interested in enjoying the good life in NYC, London and Dubai than in dealing with attacks on their sovereignty for fear of angering Shiites in the region.
nice analysis
best of luck with the optimism
Thanks for your perspective and valuable insight. Historically, not many have managed to conquer Yemenis. Sadly, current developments in the region are showing signs of extended disruption and regional uncertainty
Permanent or Temporary?
You are a gem among the gaslighters and virtue signalers. Please never stop writing ❤️
KSA will fall before Ansarallah. You speak of economic pressure but that has never worked against Iran and Yemen has almost no economy to speak of. They are 100% committed and will not stop fighting until they are martyred or victorious. Contrast that with the decadent Saudis. They cannot withstand a single season of economic pressure and they must hire proxies to fight their wars. MBS betrayed the tribes and stopped paying them off. Ansarallah marched to Mokha. IRGC and Ansarallah do not need a functioning economy to keep Hormuz and bab Al mandeb closed long enough to blow up $1T of derivative trades rested on the energy markets. Watch markets crash and regimes fall. IRGC can control the news cycle so they can control markets. They saw Trump and cronies do this now the game is clear for anyone to see. Next move is to cut fiber optic cables. This will happen at the most consequential moment possible. All GCC will fall as their power was built on sands that have shifted. The rule through patronage and brutality. Israel will not save them either, Israel will see them burn! Any moment Israel can bomb Iran and Iran will send GCC energy production back a decade. Dark times await us.
You don't do well with reasoned criticism do you?
Not so beyond the ideological after all?
Need subs and some initial reader to get motivation for Writing guys.
Please rate my work your suggestion will be appreciated.
https://inzet.substack.com/p/the-houthi-endgame-in-yemen?r=93cwu8&utm_medium=ios
Good essay. Well-written and informative.
It was ok until the analysis on Iran.... I don't really want to say what is what, but the argument you make is excellent on China if factual, but the supply lines and finances are a bit more complex.... Just a bit more work and you will be there.... sorry
Trouble is America has its fingers in too many pies and thus it is virtually impossible for America to focus on one thing. I have read that anti-Houthi efforts clashed with anti -ISIS effort even when Houthis were presenting bigger threat.