9 Comments
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Christine K's avatar

American unreliability in the Gulf is rooted in our ignorance of the history detailed in this article. Our intolerance for short-term loss (higher gas prices/ inflation) drives the countervailing narrative that this war serves only Trump’s ambitions. This drives the conviction that the mid-terms will be a blood bath. Here’s to hoping that Americans can build the institutional memory to see through the fog of this war, and stay the course.

Moiz Rafay's avatar

I'm an ex-muslim in Pakistan desperately hoping the American public supports President Trump through this.

There's one more aspect Zineb Riboua misses; Iran is the first majority ex-muslim country in 1400 years. If Iran turns from terror state to democratic secular ally to Israel... that's not just a benefit for the US and Israel... that's the start of great social change in the muslim world. That secularization will spread, I promise you.

minuteman's avatar

US presence in the Middle East is once a for all liquidated. And its not coming back. But hey, Winning!🫵🏻🍊

Saul's avatar

As a side-issue (at least for the moment), whither Gaza? My assumption is that once the fighting ends, the GCC will be much more interested in reconstituting their own countries than pouring additional billions into any Hamas controlled area. Israel could essentially annex the c50% that it currently occupies with relatively little blowback. More important is the strategy of Saudi Arabia-how far will they move towards normalisation with Israel?

Balkan Yankee's avatar

Yes. Iran truly is the author of its own isolation. If the regime somehow remains in place after the severe pounding it is receiving, even in greatly diminished form, then enduring Arab-Israeli security cooperation under U.S. leadership will be likely. But should the regime fall, as hoped, the value of this cooperation would diminish given the absence of the unifying threat that motivated it in the first place.

We could hypothesize about the kinds of regional security arrangements that might be constructed following the regime's demise, but the price for full Gulf Arab participation in Abraham Accords 2.0 likely will include some dispensation for Palestinian autonomy. It's hard to imagine Riyadh budging on its long stated interest in a two-state answer to the Palestinian question.

And of course, neo-Ottoman Turkey likely sees an irresistible opportunity to transform its considerable regional influence into a position of true regional leadership or to frustrate competing plans if it cannot.

Next comes the role of outside powers -- the U.S., Russia, and China -- and what regional schemes they might advance in concert or in opposition with regional players. The U.S. is committed to the Abraham Accords, Russia is bogged down in the Ukraine War, and China is being acted upon by events beyond its control.

In the meantime, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed to maritime transit. Whether the U.S. and its allies can reopen it is the immediate issue upon which the bigger issue of who gets to construct the new regional order rests.

Mike Berger's avatar

"The question before Washington is whether it will recognize the opening for the most consequential strategic consolidation the region has seen in a generation."

It's bigger than that. It will be the most consequential defeat for America for more than a generation and will have incalculable consequences.

Naaji Abukar's avatar

You seem to be blinded by the reality on the ground. Simply put, the vast majority (90% plus) of individuals in the broader Middle East hate Israel and probably always will. The statistical data is out in the open, why do you ignore the facts on the ground. Oh wait, you're a Jewish Zionist, nevermind.

Mr. Ala's avatar

Great if true.

Jon E's avatar

Unless the regime survives and uses its control over the strait of Hormuz along with a reconstituted nuclear threat to force its will on the Gulf states.