Riboua's Near East Newsletter #7
Moscow’s Southward March
This analysis was initially featured in my monthly Hudson report, Moscow’s Southward March: Russia’s Geopolitical Strategies in the Middle East and Africa.
What unfolded this month regarding Russia's activities and influence in Africa and the Middle East?
A few developments stand out:
Putin Whistles Past the Graveyard in Syria
At his annual news conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to project strength and authority. He touted Russia’s economic resilience against sanctions and military success in Ukraine and downplayed longtime Russian ally Bashar al-Assad’s fall in Syria.
“I haven’t yet seen President Assad since he arrived in Moscow, but I plan to. I will definitely speak with him,” Putin told an American journalist. With this statement, Putin sought to (a) minimize the issue, (b) highlight Russia’s enduring influence in the Middle East, and (c) frame Moscow as a stabilizing power in the region, with Assad’s fall as another step in its plan.
“You want to present what is happening in Syria as a defeat for Russia,” he said. “I assure you it is not. We have achieved our goals.”
Why it matters
Putin rejected the prevailing narrative that Assad’s fall hurts Russia. But the collapse of a long-cultivated ally is a significant blow to Moscow’s influence. Along with tarnishing Putin’s image as a reliable ally, the regime’s collapse raises questions about the future of Russia’s military foothold in the Middle East. Russia looks set to lose the critical bases that have anchored its presence in the region—and served as a launching pad for the Wagner private paramilitary group’s efforts to expand the Kremlin’s influence in Africa.
Now Russia has two choices: (1) strike a deal with Syria’s transition government, or (2) cut its losses and refocus elsewhere. The latter could mean doubling down in Libya or seizing an opportunity in Sudan. Either way, Moscow’s influence and prestige on the global stage have taken a significant hit.
This opens the door for the United States to reassert leadership, strengthen its alliances, and counter Russian influence in the Middle East and beyond.
Chalkboard Diplomacy: Russia’s Education Strategy in Burkina Faso
The Washington Post recently reported that Russia is expanding its educational and cultural programs in Burkina Faso. Russia also agreed to accept Burkinabe exchange students after France stopped issuing them visas in 2023. This underscores Ouagadougou’s pivot toward Moscow following the 2022 coup that brought Captain Ibrahim Traoré to power. With help from Russia’s Wagner, Traoré’s junta has slammed the door on its Western partners—particularly France—and rolled out the red carpet for Russia.
Facing rising Western sanctions, Russia has reciprocated this enthusiasm. Putin announced in July that Russia had increased its quota for African students by 150 percent in the last three years. And at the 2024 Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that “the cooperation between the Russian Federation and African states is becoming increasingly comprehensive and multidimensional.”
Why it matters
Russia, like a spider spinning a web, is positioning itself as the central partner for African nations that wish to break from the West. Educational initiatives, which seek to shape and influence Africa’s future elites, are more than cultural exchanges—they are another thread of Moscow’s grand geopolitical designs. Russia seeks to nurture a generation of African leaders fluent in Russian culture, politics, and values, ensuring Moscow’s influence lingers long after the diplomas are handed out.
This approach dates to the Cold War. Several prominent African leaders were educated in Soviet institutions like the prestigious Patrice Lumumba University (now the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia). They would go on to shape their nations’ trajectories and maintain ties with Moscow.
While the United States struggles to fully engage with Africa—often focusing narrowly on counterterrorism and trade without adequately addressing deeper, long-term partnerships—Russia is quietly building its influence by fostering personal and institutional ties through education and cultural diplomacy.
Senegal and the Ivory Coast Say Au Revoir
The wave of anti-French sentiment sweeping across West Africa has reached Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In December 2024, Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said it was “obvious” that French soldiers would soon depart Senegalese soil. “Just because the French have been here since the slavery period doesn’t mean it’s impossible to do otherwise,” he added. Similarly, Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara announced the withdrawal of French forces in his end-of-year address.
Paris had already planned to reduce its military presence in West and Central Africa from 2,200 troops to around 600. But France’s departures from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mali signal a clear turning point for Paris’s alliances in West Africa.
Soon after President Faye’s statement, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko announced that “the president of the republic has decided to close all foreign military bases.” While the official statement did not explicitly mention France, the implication is obvious. But another foreign power could soon have boots on the ground in Senegal. Paris’s declining political and military influence in a region historically dominated by Western powers leaves a strategic vacuum that Moscow appears eager to fill.
The Kremlin’s anti-Western rhetoric, which portrays France and the United States as exploitative neocolonial powers, has resonated in the Sahel and West Africa, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Russia presents itself as an alternative, offering military support—often through the Wagner Group—alongside promises of resource-backed partnerships.
In July 2024, Putin invited African leaders to a summit in St. Petersburg, where they agreed to promote a multipolar world order and combat neocolonialism. Putin hailed the states’ commitment “to the formation of a just and democratic multipolar world order.”
Why it matters
This rebalancing in West Africa poses significant challenges for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s southern strategy. The Sahel, once central to French and NATO counterterrorism efforts, is becoming a security vacuum. Russia and China have rushed to fill this void, seeing an opportunity to challenge US influence and reshape regional power dynamics in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.
Instability in the Sahel fuels terrorism, jihadism, illegal migration, and trafficking. Each year Jihadist violence kills over 10,000 people in the region, and migrant arrivals in Europe have exceeded 230,000. France’s reduced presence and the absence of a coordinated NATO response allow actors like Russia to exploit instability in the region. The absence of US allies and the increased presence of adversaries on the continent limits America’s ability to project power and undermines its efforts to strengthen partnerships with African countries in areas such as counterterrorism.
Libya in the Kremlin’s Crosshairs
Satellite images showed Russian cargo planes ferrying military equipment and personnel from Syria to Libya in mid-December, signaling a major shift in Moscow’s military strategy. A Syrian official confirmed that an II-76 cargo plane took off from Syria’s Hmeimim Air Base, heading straight for Libya. This suggests Russia seeks to maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean in the wake of the Assad regime’s fall.
Russia has also redeployed advanced air-defense assets, including the formidable S-300 and S-400 systems, to bases in eastern Libyan territory controlled by notorious warlord Khalifa Haftar. The country’s central location and ongoing instability make it an attractive target for Moscow, particularly as challenges in Syria intensify. Still, Russia faces significant opposition from Libyan factions and regional powers, all reluctant to cede control of the gateway to the Mediterranean. The internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) are locked in a power struggle, further complicated by the involvement of militias.
Why it matters
With these deployments, Russia seeks to outmaneuver Western interests and position itself as the dominant force in North Africa. Russia’s interest in establishing a military presence in Libya is closely tied to its broader strategy of projecting power into Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa through the Mediterranean.
One way that Moscow can gain leverage against the West is by weaponizing migration to create instability on European nations’ southern borders. From August to October 2024, Libya hosted approximately 787,000 migrants from 44 nations, a 3 percent increase from the previous quarter. This surge underscores Libya’s role as a critical transit point for migrants heading to Europe. Russia can exploit this situation to sow discord among European countries as they seek to manage growing waves of migrants.
Libya’s fragmentation is a quagmire for Russia, which will face difficulty maintaining influence as alliances shift and factions compete. With Moscow also losing ground in Syria, the US has a golden opportunity. By backing the GNU and United Nations-led peace efforts, Washington can further limit Russia’s options in the Mediterranean and bolster regional stability. The US and NATO should seize on this chance.
Russia Turns a Blind Eye to Sudan’s Famine
Russia’s recent actions in Sudan are a masterclass in geopolitical cynicism. In November 2024, Moscow vetoed a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in the country’s bloody civil war. Moscow insists there is no famine, apparently hoping denial is a substitute for diplomacy or food aid as millions starve.
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s first deputy permanent representative to the UN, dismissed reports from the Famine Review Committee (FRC) as politically motivated. “Upon examining the FRC report we couldn’t [help] but think that the issue of hunger in Sudan is being politicized and exploited to exert pressure on the Sudanese government,” Polyanskiy said.
But experts cited by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both of which Russia supports, of using “starvation tactics” against 25 million civilians across the country.
Why it matters
Russia’s famine denial in Sudan is not just callous. It is a calculated throwback to the Soviet playbook: deny the obvious, reshape the story, and push for Moscow’s interests. The Kremlin seeks to sidestep international scrutiny, undercut Western and UN relief efforts, and position itself as an anti-West champion for Africa.
Russia’s actions in Sudan are opportunistic but congruent with Moscow’s broader strategy to bolster its economy while quietly extending its geopolitical influence. For Moscow, instability is not an obstacle; it is an opportunity. By supporting both sides of the ongoing civil war, Russia hopes to maintain a foothold no matter who wins. The Wagner Group’s involvement in resource extraction—particularly gold—further entrenches the Kremlin’s position, enabling it to profit from the instability while avoiding direct international scrutiny. Aligning with unstable regimes is central to Russia’s strategy for securing access to Africa’s vital resources.
Moscow’s goals in Sudan are clear: (1) cement Russian influence, (2) derail international peace efforts, and (3) portray itself as an agent of stability—all while advancing its economic and military agenda. As the crisis worsens, Putin’s disinformation strategy deepens the suffering of millions and fractures global unity, paving the way for Moscow to tighten its grip on Africa.
The longer the US and its allies hesitate to secure a ceasefire in Sudan, the greater the chaos Russia will unleash, destabilizing the region, undermining NATO, and accelerating a dangerous shift in global power.
Solid insights.