How Israel’s Operation Rising Lion Dismantled Iran from Within

A Case Study in the Art of Deception

This report was originally published by Hudson Institute

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On June 13, the Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a strategic collapse that altered the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel eliminated key Iranian military and scientific personnel, degraded the country’s missile infrastructure, and neutralized its early-warning systems. But more consequentially, Israel’s strike—dubbed Operation Rising Lion—shattered the Iranian regime’s confidence in its own security apparatus.

This outcome was the result of years of sustained intelligence preparation, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) dominance, and deep operational infiltration. Israeli planners achieved full-spectrum disruption by dismantling Iran’s command and control networks, severing high-level communications, and injecting uncertainty into the regime’s decision-making processes.

By the time Tehran could react, the damage was already done. Its upper command was dead, its defensive systems were disabled, and its internal threat assessments were in disarray. Crucially, Israel did not rely on cross-border operations. It had pre-positioned remote-activated strike platforms inside Iran and deployed them with surgical precision.

Israel’s operational concept combined a decapitation strike with cognitive disruption. The psychological warfare element—that the strike had come from Iranian soil—amplified the attack’s kinetic effects, leaving Tehran paralyzed. Unable to determine whether it had been infiltrated or outmaneuvered, the regime’s ability to respond collapsed before it could launch a single countermeasure.

I. Strategic Complacency: How Iran Misread the Coming Storm

The first two warnings came in July 2024 and September 2024. In July, Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh—Hamas’s top political official and a guest of the Islamic Republic—in the heart of Tehran, demonstrating its ability to penetrate Iran’s capital, bypass multiple layers of security, and execute a precision strike without visible attribution. The second warning followed in September, when Israel conducted a sophisticated attack using explosive pagers against Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, killing dozens and injuring thousands. This showcased its capacity to infiltrate and disrupt enemy networks. These operations sent a strategic message and served as rehearsals for something much larger.

Tehran failed to grasp the significance. The regime dismissed the assassinations as internal sabotage or factional violence, refusing to entertain the possibility that a hostile state actor had executed the operation within its own territory. That misjudgment exposed a structural flaw in the Iranian regime: Tehran’s national security establishment could no longer detect or interpret threats emerging from its core.

Iran’s Miscalculations

Iran’s failure to anticipate Operation Rising Lion demonstrates a pattern of strategic miscalculations rooted in flawed assumptions about Israel, the United States, and the nature of contemporary conflict. Below are six ways Tehran miscalculated:

1. Misreading US-Israel dynamics. Iran interpreted American criticism of Israel’s Gaza operations as a sign of strategic divergence. Believing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government was isolated, Tehran likely calculated that Washington would block or dissuade a major Israeli escalation. It misjudged both the depth of US-Israel coordination and the capability of Israel’s forces.

2. Underestimating Israeli reach. In the aftermath of October 7, Iran assumed that Israel’s intelligence services were overstretched and more focused on domestic issues. Tehran discounted the idea that Israel could conduct a complex, multidomain operation deep inside Iranian territory—even after the Haniyeh strike.

3. Ignoring strategic patterns. Rather than recognizing that these assassinations were part of a broader Israeli strategy of infiltration and preemption, Iran treated them as isolated cases. It failed to see operations such as the decapitation of Hezbollah’s military elite as the opening moves of an evolving campaign.

4. Misjudging time. Tehran viewed President Donald Trump’s 60-day ultimatum as a political signal, not a real deadline. Believing it had room to maneuver, Iran continued enrichment. Israel struck on day 61.

5. Underestimating the Trump administration and the international environment. When the Trump administration resumed nuclear negotiations, Iran mistook engagement for concession. Iranian officials believed Washington’s return to talks signaled weakness and assumed they could extract sanctions relief without making meaningful concessions on uranium enrichment.

6. Neglecting Israel’s domino effect in the region. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—triggered by Israeli strikes and internal defections—shattered Iran’s assumptions about stability and escalation management. For over a decade, Tehran had relied on Assad as a linchpin of its regional strategy, projecting strength through a network of state and non-state actors anchored in Damascus. That foundation is now gone, which has disrupted IRGC supply lines and undermined Iran’s regional deterrence. Instead of adjusting its posture, Iran clung to outdated assumptions. Israel exploited this lag in adaptation, launching a fast-moving, multidomain campaign that Tehran was neither expecting nor prepared for.

China’s Role

Iran’s miscalculations were reinforced by its belief that it could rely on Beijing.

Since the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), China has steadily deepened its strategic ties with Iran. What began as an economic alignment soon evolved into political and diplomatic coordination. China presented itself not merely as a trading partner but as a guarantor of Iran’s internal stability.

In 2021, China and Iran institutionalized their partnership with a 25-year strategic agreement valued at $400 billion. Chinese companies embedded themselves across Iran’s critical sectors, from energy and telecommunications to transport and logistics. Beijing extracted tangible strategic and economic leverage—a relationship that Iran mistakenly believed would grant it geopolitical protection.

This misreading extended into Tehran’s nuclear posture. Iranian officials interpreted Chinese backing as an effective shield from geopolitical consequences. As nuclear negotiations resumed in 2025, Chinese diplomats publicly reaffirmed the 25-year pact and emphasizedmultipolarity, integration into BRICS (a China-led anti-Western alliance structure that Iran joined in 2024), and cooperation with Russia. Tehran viewed this not only as validation of its international alignment but as evidence that it could defy US and Israeli pressure without consequences.

Iran was further emboldened by its belief that the China-brokered normalization deal it signed with Saudi Arabia in early 2023 had silenced the most vocal regional opponent of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Tehran assumed Riyadh’s opposition to its nuclear program had been politically neutralized and that, with Saudi Arabia out of the equation, Washington would have less incentive to support Israeli preemptive strikes. This was a fundamental miscalculation. The Riyadh-Tehran normalization produced optics, not a strategic shift.

The convergence of flawed assumptions—Chinese support as a deterrent, Saudi normalization as a shield, and US diplomacy as a tactical delay—fomented strategic complacency in Tehran. When Washington and its allies issued a 60-day ultimatum to curb uranium enrichment, Iran dismissed it as empty signaling. It believed it still had time. It believed Israel would hold back. It believed the regional alignments would endure. It miscalculated—gravely.

II. Deception as a Strategic Art: Mastering the Psychological Battlefield

Operation Rising Lion’s success hinged on Israel’s mastery of deception and psychological warfare. Deception in modern warfare involves crafting false narratives to mislead adversaries and inducing them to misjudge intentions, capabilities, or timing. Israel’s campaign was a textbook example, paralyzing Iran’s decision-making through a carefully orchestrated web of misdirection.

In the weeks preceding the strike, Israel saturated global media, diplomatic channels, and public discourse with false cues designed to lull Tehran into complacency.

1. The Israeli security cabinet meeting that green-lit the operation was disguised as a routine discussion on Gaza hostage negotiations. Ministers were briefed only within a secure forum, signing stringent nondisclosure agreements known as shomer sod, or “guardian of the secret.” Even senior government officials believed no major action was imminent.

2. Netanyahu’s office leaked a story that he was attending his son Avner Netanyahu’s wedding in Galilee. The illusion that Israel’s leader was preoccupied with personal matters reinforced Iran’s complacency.

3. Mossad Director David Barnea and envoy Ron Dermer claimed to be on a trip to Washington via Oman for a “sixth round” of nuclear talks. These negotiations were fictitious, but their announcement suggested diplomatic progress, diverting attention from military preparations.

4. Netanyahu’s team allowed rumors of a rift with Trump over a potential Iran strike to circulate in the media, fostering perceptions of political disunity within Israel’s leadership.

Israel designed this cognitive warfare campaign to neutralize Iran’s command and control structure before kinetic operations began. For Israel, deception is a central force multiplier in operational planning. Against a highly centralized, ideologically rigid, and hierarchical regime like Iran, disrupting perception at the leadership level produces disproportionate strategic effects.

Deception has assumed growing operational significance for Israel in twenty-first-century conflict environments for three reasons:

1. The modern battlefield is saturated with ISR assets. Denying the adversary real-time situational awareness is essential for maintaining operational security and preserving the initiative.

2. In regimes like Iran, where political control and military command are tightly fused, disrupting perception at the top disables coordination throughout the chain of command.

3. Deception enables strategic surprise—a condition wherein the enemy not only fails to anticipate the strike but also fails to understand its purpose until after the fact. This degrades morale, imposes psychological paralysis, and prevents timely countermeasures.

Israel’s operation applied all these principles. It exploited Iran’s doctrinal assumptions—namely, that threats would come externally, be preceded by escalation, and require observable force buildup.

By shaping the information environment, Israel ensured that Iran would not trigger emergency protocols, disperse its senior personnel, or adopt an elevated defense posture until it was too late. Israel did not kinetically disable Tehran’s early-warning systems—it cognitively bypassed them. The effect of surprise was decisive: by the time Israeli drones activated from pre-positioned launch nodes inside Iranian territory, the regime’s national command authority had already lost the initiative.

The Islamic Republic relies on projecting strength—on appearing untouchable and firmly in control from the top down. Its deterrence is psychological as much as material. Therefore even minor disruptions to this image can have outsized effects.

The strategic purpose of deception, in this context, is to undermine that perception before a single missile is fired. By distorting the enemy’s sense of reality—through misdirection, covert infiltration, and psychological manipulation—Israel erodes the regime’s belief in its own control and security. This breeds hesitation, miscalculation, and internal confusion at the highest levels. Israel understands this well. It doesn’t just aim to win on the battlefield—it seeks to unravel the system’s confidence, creating paralysis through doubt, fragmentation, and disorientation.

III. Infiltration as a Force Multiplier

Israel’s strike on June 13 was the culmination of years of covert infiltration, where Israeli agents embedded within Iran’s physical and operational landscape. Israel’s approach combined physical and cyber infiltration, bypassing Iran’s defenses with devastating effect.

Israeli intelligence had pre-positioned precision-guided drones and explosive systems across Iranian territory, including near Tehran. These assets were concealed and dormant, bypassing Iran’s air defenses. The lack of external flight paths meant Iran’s alarm systems did not activate. This level of infiltration required years of planning to exploit vulnerabilities in Iran’s security apparatus, supply chains, and infrastructure.

Key targets included:

• Iran’s air defense. Israel obliterated these defenses before Iran could use them to respond.

• Strategic targets near Tehran. Israel launched ground-to-ground missiles and explosive drones at strategic targets near Tehran.

• Natanz nuclear facility. Israel aimed to cripple Iran’s nuclear program.

The operation’s true focus, however, was Iran’s strategic elite. In fact, the leadership vacuum introduced operational uncertainty across IRGC divisions, degrading both offensive and defensive readiness. Israel eliminated:

• Major General Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces and the architect of Iran’s drone and cyber warfare doctrines.

• Major General Hossein Salami, commander of the IRGC and the ideological voice of Iran’s defiance.

• Major General Gholam Ali Rashid, head of Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters and mastermind of Iran’s military operations.

• Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and a key figure in Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

• Dr. Mohammad Mahdi Tehranchi, a nuclear physicist linked to Iran’s covert research.

Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Major General Gholam Ali Rashid played central roles in shaping Iran’s force structure and operational doctrine. Their removal severed the operational link between strategic planning and execution. Nuclear scientists like Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi Davani and Dr. Mohammad Mahdi Tehranchi were deeply embedded in Iran’s research infrastructure and played active roles in concealing the military dimensions of the country’s nuclear activities. Their deaths created a void that Iranian leadership cannot quickly fill, particularly in a closed and ideologically rigid system like the Islamic Republic.

Historical precedent supports the logic of these strikes. The 1943 assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto dealt a lasting blow to Japanese naval coordination. Israel’s June 13 operation follows the same logic: that killing key personnel will permanently disrupt Iran’s ability to coordinate its military, technological, and diplomatic efforts.

The timing of the operation further compounded its impact. With nuclear negotiations imminent, the loss of senior IRGC officials and nuclear experts left Iran without personnel capable of shaping policy, managing technical disclosures, and coordinating messaging. Israel erased the core of Iran’s strategic competence when it was most essential. The result was immediate paralysis in Iran’s military chain of command and the diplomatic apparatus.

IV. Iran’s Response: Operational Weakness with Long-Term Costs

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed that Israel would face a “bitter and painful” fate. As part of its initial response, Tehran launched over 100 drones toward Israeli territory. Israel’s Home Front Command promptlyissued a nationwide alert, instructing civilians to remain near bomb shelters. Yet within a few hours, Israel’s air defenses had neutralized Iran’s drone swarm.

The level of Israeli infiltration exposed during Operation Rising Lion has immediate and long-term consequences for the Iranian regime. Penetration of Iran’s air defense systems, intelligence networks, and internal military infrastructure indicates a loss of control at the core of the state. This not only compromises operational security but also undermines institutional trust within the IRGC, Quds Force, and the broader intelligence establishment. When command structures can no longer distinguish between internal loyalty and external manipulation, decision-making slows, risk tolerance narrows, and factionalism grows. Over time, this environment fosters paranoia, internal purges, and bureaucratic paralysis—conditions that steadily degrade the regime’s capacity to project power, manage crises, and maintain cohesion. First, despite its threats of a forceful response, Tehran has failed to impose meaningful costs on a technologically and operationally superior adversary. What was billed as a major reprisal has largely amounted to symbolic gestures aimed at domestic audiences rather than tangible battlefield outcomes.

Second, the limitations of Iran’s response are raising doubts among its regional partners—particularly the Houthis and Hezbollah—about Tehran’s reliability as the core of the anti-Israel axis. If Iran cannot effectively retaliate when directly targeted, its credibility as a deterrent umbrella weakens across the region.

Third, the growing disconnect between Khamenei’s rhetoric and Iran’s operational reality is eroding internal cohesion. In a regime where legitimacy depends heavily on projecting strength, visible failure—especially in the face of Israeli dominance—risks deepening public skepticism and unsettling elite consensus.

If these trends continue, a deeper strategic unraveling is possible. The erosion of deterrence abroad and legitimacy at home could trigger fragmentation within Iran’s security institutions, elite defection, and increased pressure from peripheral regions. What begins as a military failure may evolve into political instability—and, over time, the disintegration of the centralized system that has held the Islamic Republic together for over four decades.

Israel, by contrast, has demonstrated control over both the military and psychological dimensions of the conflict. It has absorbed Iranian strikes with minimal disruption, maintained national composure, and reinforced its dominance in both the air and information domains. The broader message is unmistakable: Israel sets the tempo and terms. Iran is reacting—and falling behind.

V. Lessons for the United States

As the US continues to lead diplomatic efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Operation Rising Lion provides a concrete demonstration of what effective counterproliferation requires. The operation serves as a reminder that diplomacy needs to be backed by credible power, intelligence superiority, and close coordination with trusted partners. Below are seven lessons the operation offers on counterproliferation, escalation control, and the enduring value of US–Israel cooperation.

1. Counterproliferation requires covert penetration, not just monitoring.

Israel did not rely on external enforcement bodies or treaty frameworks. Instead, it embedded operatives, pre-positioned strike assets, and built a parallel intelligence architecture capable of degrading Iran’s nuclear infrastructure from within. This highlights (a) the limitations of verification regimes for dealing with a regime committed to concealment and (b) the importance of backing passive oversight with the threat of active disruption.

2. Eliminating strategic human capital halts weaponization at its source.

Rather than only targeting facilities, Israel removed the intellectual and operational drivers of Iran’s nuclear program. Scientists, engineers, and senior planners with years of accumulated expertise were taken out of the equation. This approach addresses the roots of the problem in a way that no air strike on a centrifuge site could.

3. Strategic surprise prevents escalatory cascades.

The strike achieved total surprise—Iran received no warnings, distributed no alerts, and had no time for defensive repositioning. This prevented Tehran from activating contingency plans or engaging in calibrated escalation. Adversaries often expect a slow, bureaucratic Western response. But Israel showed that speed and surprise can shift the initiative and contain conflict escalation.

4. Hard power enforcement is essential when norms break down.

Israel acted while international institutions faltered. The Islamic Republic had repeatedly breached enrichment thresholds and obstructed inspections. Rather than wait for diplomatic consensus, Israel imposed a hard ceiling on Iran’s capabilities. This demonstrates that in certain cases, decisive action is not an alternative to diplomacy—it is a necessary mechanism to enforce negotiated terms.

5. Israel functions as a regional nonproliferation anchor.

Multilateral efforts often collapse under political pressure. Israel has proven willing and able to act when others are not. By destroying components of Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Israel preserved regional stability and enforced red lines that others had only articulated. This establishes Israel as a frontline actor in global nonproliferation.

6. Negotiation leverage is built on the battlefield, not at the table.

The US entered nuclear talks with Iran hoping to restrain enrichment through diplomacy. Israel countered by altering the facts on the ground. By eliminating Iran’s top nuclear scientists and strategic planners, it dramatically weakened Tehran’s position in negotiations. The lesson: diplomatic strength is a function of prior operational advantage.

7. Intelligence without enforcement undermines deterrence.

US intelligence has long tracked Iran’s violations. But it has rarely translated that into meaningful action. Israel showed what happens when intelligence is fused with political will. Washington should recognize that delaying enforcement for fear of escalation undermines the credibility of US commitments.