“Taking a new step, uttering a new word, is what people fear most.”
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment
Why does Russia always seem to be at war with the West—not just politically, but existentially? From Peter the Great’s aggressive Westernization to Catherine the Great’s flirtation with Enlightenment ideals—only to grow wary of their implications—Russia has long wrestled with its identity, caught between emulating foreign powers and asserting its own unique destiny. The Soviet Union’s Cold War defiance was yet another chapter in this enduring struggle. Today, under Putin, that same tension persists—his rejection of Western modernity echoing centuries of resistance, adaptation, and the search for a distinctly Russian path.
Oswald Spengler’s concept of pseudomorphosis offers a compelling explanation. Spengler argues that when a young culture is overshadowed by an older, dominant one, it is denied the chance to develop organically. Instead, it is forced into an ill-fitting historical mold, compelled to follow a script it never wrote.
The result? A familiar pattern in Russian history—a deep-seated resentment that festers into instability, culminating in rebellion. It is the fate of a civilization trapped in a cycle of imitation and defiance, forever torn between imposed identities and the yearning for an authentic self.
The Clash Between Russian and Western Nihilism
At the heart of this struggle lies a fundamental distinction Spengler makes between Western and Russian nihilism.
Western nihilism is the result of civilizational overdevelopment—the spiritual exhaustion of a culture in decline. It is a slow decay, where meaning erodes under the weight of hyper-rationalism, materialism, and decadence.
Russian nihilism, by contrast, is not the weariness of an aging culture but the violent convulsions of one still struggling to be born—a civilization clawing its way into existence through suffering. It is Dali’s Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of the New Man—a fragile, malformed being forcing itself out of the old world, tearing through its own constraints, unsure if it is emerging in triumph or agony. It is, more importantly, the hatred of the alien, the rage of an identity that sees foreign influence not as enrichment but as infection, poisoning the Russian soul before it has even had the chance to fully become itself.
As Spengler describes:
The contrast between Russian and Western, Jew-Christian and Late-Classical nihilisms is extreme. The one kind is hatred of the alien that is poisoning the unborn Culture in the womb of the land, the other a surfeited disgust of one’s own proper overgrowths. Depths of religious feeling, flashes of revelation, shuddering fear of the great awakening, metaphysical dreaming and yearning, belong to the beginning, as the pain of spiritual clarity belongs to the end of a history. In these pseudomorphoses they are mingled. Says Dostoyevski: "Everyone ill street and market-place now speculates about the nature of Faith."
For Spengler, Russia’s conflict with the West is not just a geopolitical rivalry but a struggle for the soul itself—a battle against the gravitational pull of an older, dominant civilization that seeks to define it before it can define itself. This is not mere defiance but a revolt against dissolution, a refusal to be reshaped, absorbed, and ultimately erased by an alien order that threatens to render Russia a mere echo rather than an origin. Spengler warned that the West, with its universalist pretensions, was also "poisoning the unborn Culture in the womb of the land," complicating Russia’s situation even more.
A Culture Caught in Suspension
Russia’s resentment toward the West is not merely geopolitical—it is civilizational. For Spengler, Russia has continually oscillated between imitation and rebellion, never fully integrating with the West yet never fully rejecting it. Each era brings a new attempt to reconcile its deep cultural instincts with external pressures, only for the pendulum to swing back toward defiance. Whether in Peter’s reforms, Stalin’s industrialization, or Putin’s nationalism, the same underlying struggle persists: a nation forever at odds with the forces that shape it from without.
Peter the Great’s Europeanization imposed a Western model on Russia’s state and elites, creating a cultural schism between a Westernized aristocracy and the Russian narod (people).
The Soviet Union represented another imposed model—this time Marxism, which Spengler dismissed as yet another foreign and alien ideology grafted onto Russia.
The post-Soviet era brought yet another attempt at Westernization under Boris Yeltsin, forcing Russia into neoliberal "shock therapy" and Western-style democracy. This process, rather than integrating Russia into the global order, deepened resentment and paved the way for Putin’s rise.
Putin as the Breaker of Western Imitation
For the Bolshevists are not the nation, or even a part of it, but the lowest stratum of this Petrinc society, alien and western like the other strata, yet not recognized by these and consequently filled with the hate of the downtrodden. It is all megalopolitan and "Civilized" — the social politics, the Intelligentsia, the literature that first in the romantic and then in the economic jargon champions freedoms and reforms, before an audience that itself belongs to the society.
The divide between Russia’s artificial, Westernized elites and its authentic cultural soul is as pronounced today as it was during the Bolshevik Revolution. For these reasons, Putin has carefully crafted his image as the guardian of “real” Russia, rejecting both Western-style liberal democracy and Soviet-era Marxism. By presenting himself as the embodiment of Russia’s organic destiny, Putin frames his leadership as a return to an uncorrupted national essence, free from ideological constructs imposed by external forces.
But Putin’s anti-Western rhetoric and policies stem from something deeper than mere political opposition—they reflect an old existential struggle against cultural subsumption. In fact, Russia’s embrace of Third Worldist and decolonial discourse reflects its resistance to what it perceives as a Western metaphysical solvent—one that dissolves cultural and historical particularity into the homogenizing logic of technocratic universalism.
For contemporary Russia, the West is not merely a geopolitical adversary but a force of dissolution, a civilization whose universalist ideals threaten to render Russia an extension of its own exhausted narrative. This is not just a contest of power but a struggle over meaning itself—between a West that has outgrown its own convictions and a Russia still fighting to define its place in history.
At its core, this is a Heideggerian crisis of Being—not simply a fear of Western dominance, but of cultural oblivion, of being reduced to a mere appendage of the very world it has spent centuries resisting. Paradoxically, Russia’s struggle is for the preservation of an identity that refuses to vanish—even as it remains uncertain of what it truly is.
Dostoevsky as Russia’s Future
The real Russian is a disciple of Dostoyevski. Although he may not have read Dostoyevski or anyone else, nay, perhaps because he cannot read, he is himself Dostoyevski in substance; and if the Bolshevists, who see in Christ a mere social revolutionist like themselves, were not intellectually so narrowed, it would be in Dostoyevski that they would recognize their prime enemy. What gave this revolution its momentum was not the intelligentsia's hatred. It was the people itself, which, without hatred urged only by the need of throwing of a disease, destroyed the old Westernism in one effort of upheaval, and will send the new after it in another.
If Spengler is correct, Russia’s future does not lie in imitation of the West but in the assertion of its own spiritual and nationalist identity. Rather than adopting external models, Russia must carve out a path that is uniquely its own—one rooted in its historical consciousness and cultural essence.
Spengler saw Russia as caught between two competing worldviews. On one side stood Tolstoy’s Western-influenced rationalism, which symbolized Russia’s flirtation with European modernity—a vision that sought progress through reason, reform, and alignment with the West.
On the other side was Dostoevsky’s deeply Russian, mystical vision, one defined by faith, suffering, and destiny. This was not a rationalist project but a spiritual and existential one, emphasizing Russia’s unique role in history—not as an extension of Europe, but as a civilization unto itself.
Putin’s Russia is moving decisively toward the latter. His revival of Orthodoxy, nationalism and ideas of messianic destiny align precisely with Dostoevsky’s spiritual vision of Russia—not as just another state, but as a civilization with a historical mission.
Now, Russia faces a crossroads: Does it break free from Western influence to forge its own civilizational model? Or does it remain in perpetual reaction, never fully escaping the gravitational pull of the West?
History offers no refuge for a nation caught between becoming and despair. Spengler saw Russia as a culture yet to be born, its destiny still writhing in the throes of unfinished creation. Under Putin, that birth is no gentle awakening but a violent convulsion, a struggle waged not in quiet evolution but in fire, blood, and sacrifice. Like a Dostoevskian tragedy, Russia does not step into the future—it is dragged there, screaming, tearing at the past even as it seeks to escape it.
I think Russia is on a road to embrace a rightist Western reaction to the contemporary Western institutionalism. Russian philosophy has historically evolved as embracing Western counter or reactionary philosophy. Subscribed.
Between Putin and Trump we seem to be caught in some sort of Heideggerian nightmare reminiscent of Jack Kerouac at Big Sur ...